...
| Date | Time | Room | Speaker | Affiliation | Synopsis | Paper |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 9:00AM to 10:30AM | 4151 Grainger Hall | Omid Rafieian | University of Washington | See synopsis | Pending |
| 9:00AM to 10:30AM | 4151 Grainger Hall | Tesary Lin | University of Chicago | Pending See synopsis | Pending |
| 9:00AM to 10:30AM | 4151 Grainger Hall | Matt McGranaghan | Cornell University | Pending | Pending |
| 9:00AM to 10:30AM | 4151 Grainger Hall | Dan Yavorsky | University of California-Los Angeles | Pending | Pending |
| 9:00AM to 10:30AM | 4151 Grainger Hall | Cheng He | Georgia Tech University | Pending | Pending |
| 9:00AM to 10:30AM | 4151 Grainger Hall | Unnati Narang | Texas A&M University | Pending | Pending |
Omid Rafieian, Doctoral Student, University of Washington
...
Digital publishers often use real-time auctions to allocate their advertising inventory. These auctions are designed with the assumption that advertising exposures within a user’s browsing or app-usage session are independent. Rafieian (2019) empirically documents the interdependence in the sequence of ads in mobile in-app advertising, and shows that dynamic sequencing of ads can improve the match between users and ads. In this paper, we examine the revenue gains from adopting a revenue-optimal dynamic auction to sequence ads. We propose a unified framework with two components – (1) a theoretical framework to derive the revenue-optimal dynamic auction that captures both advertisers’ strategic bidding and users’ ad response and app usage, and (2) an empirical framework that involves the structural estimation of advertisers’ click valuations as well as personalized estimation of users’ behavior using machine learning techniques. We apply our framework to large-scale data from the leading in-app ad-network of an Asian country. We document significant revenue gains from using the revenue-optimal dynamic auction compared to the revenue-optimal static auction. These gains stem from the improvement in the match between users and ads in the dynamic auction. The revenue-optimal dynamic auction also improves all key market outcomes, such as the total surplus, average advertisers’ surplus, and market concentration.
Tesary Lin, Doctoral Student, University of Chicago
Anchor lin-tesary lin-tesary
Valuing Intrinsic and Instrumental Preferences for Privacy
| lin-tesary | |
| lin-tesary |
Synopsis
In this paper, I propose a framework for understanding why and to what extent people value their privacy. In particular, I distinguish between two motives for protecting privacy: the intrinsic motive, that is, a “taste” for privacy; and the instrumental motive, which reflects the expected economic loss from revealing one’s “type” specific to the transactional environment. Distinguishing between the two preference components not only improves the measurement of privacy preferences across contexts, but also plays a crucial role in developing inferences based on data voluntarily shared by consumers. Combining a two-stage experiment and a structural model, I measure the dollar value of revealed preference corresponding to each motive, and examine how these two motives codetermine the composition of consumers choosing to protect their personal data. The compositional differences between consumers who withhold and who share their data strongly influence the quality of firms’ inference on consumers and their subsequent managerial decisions. Counterfactual analysis investigates strategies firms can adopt to improve their inference: Ex ante, firms can allocate resources to collect personal data where their marginal value is the highest. Ex post, a consumer’s data-sharing decision per se contains information that reflects how consumers self-select into data sharing, and improves aggregate-level managerial decisions. Firms can leverage this information instead of imposing arbitrary assumptions on consumers not in their dataset.
Anchor 2019marketingcamp 2019marketingcamp
2019 Marketing Camp
| 2019marketingcamp | |
| 2019marketingcamp |
...